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We are gathered here to honor
you for your seriousness about
and success in your legal
education. It is fitting and
proper that we should do this,
for law is a learned profession,
and mastery of it is a critical and
continuing duty, as well, I hope,
as a pleasure. But this
convocation is also, as Holmes
put it, a time when the Law
School "becomes conscious of
itself and its meaning. 111 I want
to combine these two purposes
by discussing with you our
common enterprise of education
for a learned profession.
Specifically, I want to consider a
distinctive feature of legal
education, the Socratic method.
My thesis is this:
The Socratic method is not
dead. Perhaps it is not even
dying. But it has entered a frail
and faltering old age. Fewer and
fewer classes are taught
Socratically. And when they
are, it is often in ways that
effectively limit the method's
range, so that, for example, only
volunteers or students warned
in advance are called on. 2 I want
to ask how this change has come
about and whether it matters.

NEW SUBSTANCE, NEW STYLE

....

As you might suppose, two groups
have contributed to the present infirmity
of the Socratic method - the faculty and
the students. Let us begin with the
faculty's role.
Many professors use the Socratic
method less than their predecessors
because they are teaching a different
subject. The Socratic method arose when
the law's doctrines - especially the
common law's doctrines - dominated
not just the work of courts and legislatures, but also law schools. Today,
doctrine has lost some of its dignity. Our
conventional wisdom is that the best
preparation a law school like ours can
give its students is one that does more
than train them in the substance of
specific legal doctrines and the traditional
techniques of doctrinal analysis. It also
should attempt to teach students to
appreciate the larger principles that
underlie legal doctrines, to grasp the
non-doctrinal ways of reasoning the law
employs, and to understand law as a
social actor.
In consequence, law professors today
are likelier than their predecessors to
draw on disciplines other than lawdisciplines like economics, psychology,
and sociology. For one thing, lawyers,
legislators, and judges now speak those
languages. Woe betide the antitrust
lawyer who is ignorant of economics,
the mergers-and-acquisitions lawyer who
knows no corporate finance, or the
family lawyer who is a stranger to
psychology. For another thing, the social
sciences and the humanities provide
systematic ways of analyzing the law's
behavior. Thus the contemporary law
professor moves beyond legal doctrine
because doctrine itself has overflowed its
traditional boundaries and because legal
education is thought to demand a grasp
of "why" as well as "how."
This change in substance animates a
change in pedagogy: It propels teachers
away from the Socratic method and
toward the lecture. In principle, perhaps
it need not and even ought not. But in

practice, I think it does. The trend
toward a more interdisciplinary curriculum means a more interdisciplinary
professoriate. Many of my colleagues
have Ph.D.s as well as ].D.s. They were
thus trained in fields which historically
have relied primarily on the lecture, not
the Socratic dialogue, and they find it
natural to follow suit.
The inclusion of "law and" subjects in
the curriculum conduces toward lecturing for another reason. Because "law and"
disciplines have their own substantial
bodies of knowledge, law students often
need to acquire a grounding in them
before discussion becomes feasible. And
because "law and" subjects have their
own esoteric forms of analysis, students
often lack the skill to engage in Socratic
discussion in those fields. For both
reasons, lectures supplant dialogue.
The faculty resist the Socratic method
for yet another kind of reason. Law
teaching is now peopled by members of a
generation that first encountered the
Socratic method when it was practiced
more sternly than it is now. They, of all
generations, most vehemently rejected
Socraticism as competitive and hierarchical, brutal and vicious. These onetime
students, now professors, may have
moderated their views somewhat, but I
think they are still uneasy with any
method of instruction that places public
demands on students and that seems to
invite public distinctions between them.
Finally, the faculty incentive structure
of law schools has changed in ways that
diminish the appeal of the Socratic

1.

2.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Brown University
Commencement 1897, in Collected Legal papers
164, 164 (Harcourt, Brace, 1920).
I find some confirmation for this conclusion,
which is based on impressions I have formed
over the last twenty years in law schools, in
Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert S. Redmount, Legal
Education: The Classroom Experience, 52 Notre
Dame Lavqer 190, 199 (1976), which reports
the results of a modest empirical study that
concludes that "lecture is almost a universal
teaching method in law school."
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THE SOCRATIC
METHOD CAN SEEM
MERELY PERVERSE ,
OBSCURING WHAT
OUGHT TO BE
CLARIFIED,
COMPLICATING
WHAT OUGHT
TO BE SIMPLIFIED,
QUESTIONING
WHAT OUGHT
TO BE CONFIRMED.

method. Traditionally, the ethos of law
schools has been that teaching is a truly
cherished part of a professor's job. I
doubt that anywhere in the university is
teaching taken more seriously or more
consistently done skillfully. Law professors commonly spend more time preparing for class, invest more energy in class,
and devote more time to grading exams
than the generality of professors in
American universities.
However, this ethos is under pressure.
Once you could be a respectable law
professor without writing overmuch.
Today, tenure is a good deal harder to
come by and demands more writing. And
there is a fiercer expectation that you will
continue to publish after tenure. This is
not just a local condition. It is part of the
national competition of law schools. A
school that wants to be esteemed must
have a prolific faculty. Were this not such
a faculty, you wouldn't want to come
here.
But time for writing has to come from
some place, and teaching is the obvious
source. Lecturing is the obvious way of
honorably borrowing time from teaching.
The Socratic method continually prods
professors to prepare for each class. But
once you have written a lecture, you have
only to browse through your notes before
class, making whatever adjustments
developments in the law may require .
And because lecturing is, over the years,
less stimulating for the professor than
class discussion , it is, over the years,
likely to evoke less intense effort.
THE STUDENTS' SIDE

T
Pressure to abandon or dilute the
Socratic method comes from students as
well as faculty. The Socratic method ,
after all, relies at least as much on
students as on teachers. If students have
not read and thought meticulously about
a subject, a rewarding discussion of it is
most unlikely. However, in the years I
have been a student and professor here ,
the customary standard of preparation
has become markedly less onerous.
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The reasons for this b gin with th job
market. That incubus now dominates li£
even in a school far enough from a large
city that relatively few students work
during the term. Interviews for summer
and permanent jobs, fly-backs, and the
joys and tears of discussing them swallow
up time and energy that was once
devoted to class. This trend persists
despite our graduates' triumphant
success in finding desirable jobs. Indeed,
exactly because our students have such
fine job prospects, they begin to suspect
in their second year that their performance in class may not affect their
careers crucially. Further, the trend
persists in bad times and good. The bad
times create alarm that leads people to
interview more . The good times give
people more chances to savor the
delights of being courted.
In addition, our incentive structure
does not greatly encourage strong class
preparation. For example, many classes
are so big that, even if you want to , you
can't talk very often or very long. The
pass-fail option and the late deadline for
exercising it dull the spur that grades
provide to do the reading on time.
For that matter, few professors directly
reward good class performance with
higher grades. Finally, many students
discover that they can do tolerably well
on final exams even if they postpone
most of their studying until the end of
the semester.
Finally, many students prefer lectures
to the Socratic method because they
conceive of their task only as learning the
substance of the law. The most frequent
comment I hear from students who come
to see me about an exam is "I don't see
why I didn't do better; I'm sure I really
knew the material. " When the goal of
mastering legal analysis is thus scanted,
the Socratic method can seem merely
perverse , obscuring what ought to be

clarified, complicating what ought to be
simplified, questioning what ought to be
confirmed. Professors hear this view in
talking with students, in the student
newspaper, and in course evaluations,
and it does not go unnoticed.
There are, then, both faculty and
student disincentives to the Socratic
method. What is more, they continually
reinforce each other. As the faculty
lectures more and calls on students less,
students quite understandably respond
by preparing less for class. As students
come to class less thoroughly prepared,
the faculty quite understandably adapts
by lecturing more.
SICK BUT WORTH SAVING
T
Well, so what? Does it matter that
we're using the Socratic method less and
enjoying it less? The Socratic method was
always better at some things than others.
It was always open to the objection that it
is a clumsy way of communicating
information and ideas. Students, of
course, must learn some of the law's
substance, and insofar as class is intended to help them do so, the Socratic
method may not always be optimal.
Further, I have already suggested some
reasons the Socratic method may seem
less attractive in a world in which law
teaching is less doctrinal and more
interdisciplinary. Finally, some professors
enjoy the Socratic method more than
others, and some are better at it than
others. For all these reasons, the Socratic
method is not apt for all times, places,
people, and tasks.
Nevertheless, as you may have
gathered, I think the Socratic method
worth saving. Let me suggest several
reasons. I will start with a crude, but not
foolish, one. Dr. johnson once said,
"Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows
he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it
concentrates his mind wonderfully."
When a student knows that he may be

called on in class the next day, he has a
wonderful reason to study. When a
student knows that she may be called on
the next minute, she has a wonderful
reason to stay engaged and intent during
the long and - I admit it - sometimes
wearying hours of class.
To be sure, it is here that the criticism
I described earlier - that the Socratic
method invites professorial savagery enters in. I freely stipulate that that way
of teaching gives the professor more
opportunity and scope for belligerence,
sarcasm, and derision than lecturing. And
some of my friends who are slightly older
than I say that as students they encountered professors who seized the opportunity and relished i[S scope. But my sense
is that times have changed, and that such
unpleasantness is inflicted far less
frequently and primarily by inadvertence.
At least I cannot recall such an incident
when I was a student here.
THE RIGHT TOOL FOR OUR TASK

"'

My next point in favor of the Socratic
method is that, while it may not be ideal
for the exposition of factual material, or
even for helping students straighten out
complicated doctrines, work of that sort
should not be the main business of a law
school class. For one thing, such ideas
are most efficiently communicated and
assimilated through texts. For another, it
is the student's very labor of grappling
with case and statute, with precedent and
doctrine, that is the best teacher, which is
why professors are always urging students to write their own course outlines.
Law school classes, then, should be
primarily devoted to work that can not
be done so well elsewhere.
What cannot be done so well elsewhere is what we claim as our principal
task - teaching students to think like
lawyers. I believe the Socratic method is,
despite its limits, generally a good, and
even brilliant, way of doing so. It shines
at helping students learn to read and
criticize the standard sources of legal
doctrine (for, after all, doctrine is hardly

dead, even though it may be understood
more broadly) and to detect and dissect
the legal problems, public questions,
and jurisprudential issues they present.
The Socratic method works by offering
students an opportunity that (given the
size of law school classes) they have all
too rarely - the chance to practice legal
analysis and to receive the personal
attention and assistance of a professor.
It invites students to study selected cases,
problems, or issues intensively and to
construe them in class under the guidance of an experienced analyst. The
professor offers examples of the right
kinds of questions to ask, and demonstrates by more questions the weaknesses
of the wrong kinds of answers and the
advantages of the right kinds. This
demanding regimen can also inculcate a
sense of the demanding standards of
attention, care, and rigor which have
characterized the best legal reasoning.
The process is repeated over and over
again until students become experienced,
skilled, and confident. The principle is
that practice makes perfect.
Furthermore, whatever the limits of
the Socratic method, they are modest
next to the drawbacks of the lecture
method. At least in a field that is not
changing rapidly, lectures are open to
one crushing question - if you have
something to tell us, why don't you write
it down and let us study it carefully and
conveniently? I remember asking that
question in my freshman year in college,
when one of the assigned books in my
Government l class comprised the
lectures the previous Gov l professor had
given when he taught the course, and I
still think it is a good question.
More positively, the Socratic method
on the whole conduces to better teaching
than the lecture method. I first began to
believe this when I was a law student at
Michigan and found class more
inspiriting and rewarding than in college.
Today I remember vividly only two of my
undergraduate lecture courses but many
of my law courses. The difference is not
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WHATCANNOTBEDONE
SO WELL ELSEWHERE IS
TEACHING STUDENTS TO
THINK LIKE LAWYERS.
I BELIEVE THE SOCRATIC
METHOD IS, DESPITE ITS
LIMITS , GENERALLY A GOOD,
AND EVEN BRILLIANT, WAY
OF DOING SO.
due to the relative quality of the schools,
since my undergraduate institution was
as eminent as this one. Rather, I think
(perhaps controversially) it is easier to
teach a good Socratic class than to lecture
well. A good lecture is a thing of beauty
and a joy forever, but it is painfully hard
to craft. Leading a good discussion
certainly requires considerable preparation beforehand, considerable attention at
the time , and considerable evaluation
afterward. But because it asks students to
learn by doing, because it corrects errors
and rewards insights, because it challenges students to react and reflect
because it more deeply engages the
minds of the students, and because it
draws them into the work of learning and
thus induces them to learn more richly
and deeply, it commonly repays- and
thus invites - pedagogical effort better
than lecturing.
I have been describing the forces that
impel us away from the Socratic method
and trying to suggest why we should
resist them. Every summer, I learn a little
lesson about what lies at the bottom of
the path we are treading when I teach a
course in American law for German law
students. There I am invariably assailed
by complaints about German legal
education. These complaints sound odd
to an American. In German law schools,
I am bitterly told , no professor ever calls
on a student. No student need attend

class. No grades are given. The curriculum need not be completed in any set
number of years. It's even free .
Following German academic tradition,
all courses are taught by the lecture
method. If my German students are right
these lectures are commonly not just
uninspired . Sometimes the professor
simply reads from a book he has published, or even sends his assistant to do
so. Students rarely attend class, and
before taking the single exam which
evaluates their entire law-school performance, they attend commercial review
courses. They detest law school, and their
professors detest teaching.
Of course, we are a long way from this
sorry state. On the contrary, we continue
to enjoy what may be the best system of
legal education in the world. And
whatever the method of instruction, the
quality of your education will finally
depend on you. As Holmes said of the
time when he embarked on the ocean of
the law,
There were few of the charts and lights
for which one longed . ... One found
oneself plunged in a thick fog of
details - in a black and frozen night,
in which there were no flowers , no
spring, no easy joys. Voices of authority warned that in the crush of that ice
any craft might sink. One heard Burke
saying that law sharpens the mind by
narrowing it. One heard in Thackeray
of a lawyer bending all the powers of a
great mind to a mean profession. One
saw that artists and poets shrank from
it as from an alien world. One doubted
oneself how it could be worthy of the
interest of an intelligent mind. And yet
one said to oneself, law is human - it
is a part of man, and of one world
with all the rest. There must be a drift ,
if one will go prepared and have
patience, which will bring one out to
daylight and a worthy end.3

3.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Brown University-

Commencement 1897, in Collected Legal papers
164- 65 (Harcourt , Brace, 1920).
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Ultimately, I believe the Socratic
method is preferable to the lecture
method because it is easier to learn
navigation by practicing under expert
guidance than by studying a sailing
manual. But ultimately, you have to steer
your own craft, to educate yourself.
However much guidance and stimulation
you receive in school, you can only learn
the law by the prolonged and solitary
study and the kinds of extra-curricular
activities for which you are being recognized today. And part of what it means to
enter a learned profession is that your
education only begins with law school,
that you will continue to teach yourself to
understand your calling more deeply, to
serve your clients more wisely, and to
wield your profession's influence more
justly. Your presence here today testifies
how far you have already come in doing
so . I salute you with pleasure in the past
and hope for the future .

mm
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